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ABSTRACT 
Participatory approaches are an increasingly prominent technique for designing agricultural strategies 
within Sub-Saharan Africa. However, such approaches are frequently criticized for either not involving 
enough stakeholders or limiting the scope of their participation. By analyzing the role of stakeholder 
participation in the formulation of agricultural and rural development strategies in West Africa, this paper 
finds that a lack of broad-based participation in these strategies was not a major problem. Rather, the real 
challenge lies in transforming the outcomes of participatory processes into policies that can be feasibly 
implemented. The paper highlights why an emphasis on participatory processes can sometimes result in 
disappointment among stakeholders and discusses a range of measures to help overcome this dilemma.  
Key words: agricultural and rural development strategies; policy processes; West Africa; 
participation; representative democracy   vi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
CAADP   Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program 
CET   Common external tariff  
CNCR   Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux (Senegal) [National 
Council of Consultation and Cooperation of the Rural Sector]  
COPAGEN   Coalition pour la Protection du Patrimoine génétique africain (Burkina Faso) [Coalition 
for the Protection of Africa’s Genetic Inheritance]  
CPF   Confédération des Paysannes du Faso [Confederation of Burkinabè Peasants] 
DAPS   Direction de l’Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques (Senegal) [Department of 
Analysis, Planning, and Statistics]    
ECOWAP   Agricultural Policy of the Economic Community of West African States 
ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States  
FEB   Fédération des Eleveurs du Burkina [Federation of Livestock Producers of Burkina Faso]  
FENAFER-B   Fédération Nationale des Femmes Rurales du Burkina [National Federation of Rural 
Women of Burkina Faso]  
FEPAB   Fédération des Professionnels Agricoles du Faso [Federation of Burkinabè Agricultural 
Professionals]  
FNJPAF  Fédération Nationale des Jeunes Professionnels Agricoles du Faso [National Federation 
of Burkinabè Young Agricultural Professionals]  
GOANA  Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance (Senegal) [Great 
Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance]  
HIPC  Heavily indebted poor countries  
IMF   International Monetary Fund  
LOASP   Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale (Senegal) [Agricultural Framework Law]  
NEPAD   New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
PASA   Programmes d’Ajustement Structurel Agricole (Senegal) [Agricultural Structural 
Adjustment Programs] 
PAU   Politique Agricole d’UEMOA [Agricultural Policy of UEMOA] 
PISA   Programme d’Investissement du Secteur Agricole (Senegal) [Program of Agriculture 
Sector Investment] 
PRSP  Poverty reduction strategy paper 
PSAOP  Programme de Services Agricoles et Organisations des Producteurs (Senegal) 
[Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Program]  
ROPPA  Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
[Network of Peasant Organizations and Agricultural Producers of West Africa] 
SDR  Stratégie de Dévéloppement Rural (Burkina Faso) [Rural Development Strategy]  
SP-CPSA  Secrétariat Permanent de la Coordination des Politiques Sectorielles Agricoles (Burkina 
Faso) [Permanent Secretary for the Coordination of Agricultural Sector Policies] 
UEMOA  Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine [West African Economic and Monetary 
Union] 
UNPCB  Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du Burkina [National Union of Cotton 
Producers of Burkina Faso] 
   1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades have seen a rise of stakeholder participation in policymaking throughout Africa. 
This trend was promoted by both international organizations and domestic developments, especially the 
rise of democracy and the emergence of civil society organizations. For those African countries that were 
accepted as part of the Bretton Woods Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, the process of 
crafting the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) accorded high priority to participation by key 
country stakeholders. The trend toward participation is, however, not limited to PRSPs. Within the 
agricultural sector, the World Bank’s strategy, titled “Reaching the Rural Poor,” stresses the need for 
broad stakeholder participation in the development of national rural development strategies (World Bank 
2003, 75), and this point is reiterated in the more recent World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for 
Development (World Bank 2007, 249). Between 2003 and 2006, the World Bank supported the 
participatory development of national and subnational rural development strategies in more than 50 
countries.
1 Other international development agencies also support the participatory formulation of 
agricultural and rural development strategies, and they have agreed to coordinate their efforts in this 
regard (GDPRD 2006). Reflecting efforts to promote regional integration in East, West, and Southern 
Africa, the participatory development of agricultural and rural development strategies is now also 
promoted at the regional level.  
In view of the recent food crisis, agricultural development strategies have gained new importance. 
Therefore, this is an appropriate time to review the role of participation in the formulation of rural and 
agricultural development strategies. As such, this paper presents case studies of two national and two 
regional agricultural and rural development strategies in West Africa. To study participatory policy 
processes at the national level, Senegal and Burkina Faso were selected. Both countries engaged in the 
participatory development of a major agricultural and rural development strategy. At the same time, they 
differ in key dimensions, including degree of democratization, economic liberalization, and importance of 
agriculture to their economies, thereby providing the scope for interesting comparisons. To gain insights 
on participatory policymaking at the regional level, the formulation of agricultural development strategies 
by the two major economic communities in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), was reviewed. 
With 16 anglophone and francophone member countries, ECOWAS is the larger of the two organizations. 
UEMOA comprises eight francophone countries, all of which are also members of ECOWAS. 
The fieldwork for the study was conducted in the summer of 2006. Semistructured interviews 
constituted the main research method, and stakeholders were chosen according to the principles of 
“completeness” and “dissimilarity” (Blee and Taylor 2002). Specifically, the selected interviewees were 
identified as possessing diverse perspectives on, and being highly involved in, the shaping of agricultural 
policies in their country and in West Africa more broadly. Overall, the chosen stakeholders spanned five 
major categories: government ministries, research institutes, producer organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.  
The results reveal major challenges associated with the participatory formulation of national and 
regional agricultural development strategies. A major criticism in the literature on participatory policy 
processes holds that there is not enough participation, indicating that important stakeholders remain 
excluded. However, in the cases examined here, this was not the major problem. The intensity of 
consultations was rather high, and the relatively strong organization of the agricultural and rural 
population allowed for meaningful participation. Instead, the major challenge was transforming the 
outcomes of participatory processes into policies that could be feasibly implemented. This disconnect 
between participation and implementation was influenced by political considerations, financial 
constraints, fundamental differences in opinion among key interest groups, and a lack of communication 
by governments on policy decisions taken subsequent to the period of stakeholder involvement.     
                                                      
1 Personal communication with Jock Anderson of the World Bank’s Agricultural and Rural Development Department, 
August 15, 2008.   2
To elaborate this argument in detail, the following section reviews the existing literature on 
participatory policymaking, specifically focusing on the lack of attention to what “participation” actually 
means and a failure to examine its impact on policy implementation. Subsequently, the national and 
regional case studies conducted in West Africa are presented. Next, the implications of the case study 
findings are presented and some policy recommendations are offered. The final section provides 
concluding remarks.  
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2.  THE PROMISE OF PARTICIPATION  
Participation is a common theme in contemporary development policymaking. All of the major 
international donors highlight the importance of participatory and transparent processes in a majority of 
their projects. The World Bank, for example, has a “Participation and Civic Engagement Group” to 
ensure that governments, civil society groups, and its own staff incorporate the citizens of developing 
countries in the crafting and monitoring of policies and programs.
2 The World Bank- and IMF-sponsored 
PRSPs launched as part of the HIPC Initiative represented one of the most publicized attempts to include 
stakeholders in the creation of government development strategies. Indeed, this was supposed to be 
indicative of a new path for development agencies that stressed a departure from top-down programs and 
instead encouraged country-owned strategies arrived at through a national dialogue between governments 
and their citizens (Booth 2003; McGee, Levene, and Hughes 2002).  
The impetus for this emphasis on participation can be traced to multiple factors. First, dating back 
into the 1970s, critics of the prevailing development paradigms argued that the views and experiences of 
the poor were rarely taken into account by development professionals (e.g., Chambers 1983). This 
motivated a shift to methodologies, such as participatory poverty assessments, that were sensitive to 
measuring poverty not only with numbers but also through the experiences of those who lived it on a 
daily basis. Second, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a “wave” of democratization in much of 
Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to earlier democratic transitions in Southern Europe 
and Latin America, which were often the result of negotiated pacts among elites, these more recent 
transitions were based on mass discontent, highlighting the role of civil society and the potential for 
mobilization among everyday citizens (Bunce 2000; Stokes 1993). A growing emphasis on federalism 
and decentralization during the 1990s is the third factor contributing to the importance of participatory 
approaches. By shifting responsibilities for service provision away from the centralized state to local 
governments, the expectation was that citizens could more effectively channel their demands to 
authorities, thereby augmenting government accountability and local ownership of development projects 
and programs (e.g., Rondinelli and Nellis 1986).  
Yet the emphasis on participation within the development community has become increasingly 
questioned. One type of criticism, and certainly the most common one, is that donors have failed to 
promote enough participation. Indeed, this was the major finding of Booth’s (2003) compilation 
analyzing the crafting of PRSPs among a set of African countries. According to the contributors, 
stakeholder participation during the process was not broad enough to account for the existing degree of 
civil society engagement within these countries. A second source of criticism has emerged among those 
who believe that development institutions have used the idea of participation to their own advantage, 
thereby sacrificing its true realization for a weaker alternative. For instance, Cornwall and Brock (2005) 
note that from a discursive perspective, the term “participation” is conceptually vague and its overuse in 
the development arena makes it substantively vacuous. Likewise, Leal (2007) argues that development 
organizations have used the idea and discourse of “participation” as a veneer for promoting policies and 
practices that are decidedly neoliberal, thereby robbing the concept of its ontological foundations. A third 
and related critique is that donors do not acknowledge the inherently political nature of participatory 
processes. For instance, based on her research on water resource management, Cleaver (1999) observes 
that a technocratic emphasis on participatory methods obscures the role of power relations in the 
development process and ignores the potentially exclusionary nature of participation.  
Instead of claiming that donors have failed to push participation far enough or that they use the 
concept to promote neoliberal goals, this paper draws attention to a different problem: the disconnect 
between participation in the development policy process on the one hand and the actual policy 
implementation on the other. The topic of whether greater participation has any identifiable influence on 
policy outcomes has become a growing concern. For instance, research on civil society organizations has 
                                                      
2 See www.worldbank.org/participation/ for more information.    4
found that despite their growth, there is little evidence of their effectiveness and impact in the 
policymaking sphere (Chowdury, Finlay-Notman, and Hovland 2006; Court and Maxwell 2006; 
Robinson and Friedman 2005). By focusing on agricultural policy, this paper arrives at a similar 
conclusion. While participatory policymaking offers a form of legitimacy for a ruling government, policy 
implementation involves making trade-offs between alternative policy options. The cases of Senegal and 
Burkina Faso show that resource-poor governments often place disproportionate emphasis on 
participation but lack adequate financial resources or face political pressures that can hamper actual 
implementation. While these same challenges likewise exist at the supranational level, producer 
organizations also felt that West Africa’s regional economic organizations eschewed concerns about 
domestic food self-sufficiency in favor of promoting an agricultural strategy that stressed improving 
access to international export markets. The cases collectively highlight that the more participation is 
stressed, the greater stakeholders’ expectations about their influence on the ultimate policy outcome and 
the larger the chance for unfilled expectations. Thus, after presenting these cases, some fundamental 
conceptual questions about participation are asked and policy recommendations offered that could 
potentially prevent participatory exercises from creating false hopes.  
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3.  AGRICULTURAL POLICY PROCESSES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Senegal and Burkina Faso provide useful cases to explore national policymaking processes in the arena of 
agricultural policy. Although a sizable share of the population in each country depends on the agriculture 
sector for its livelihood, the two countries nonetheless exhibit a number of structural differences that 
enable a more nuanced examination of which factors inhibit policy implementation and how.  
3.1. Reviewing the National Context  
Senegal is one of the few African countries to have experienced a relatively long period of multiparty 
democracy. In 1976, the country began a transition from one-party rule, and in 2000, voters ousted the 
long-ruling Parti Socialiste in favor of Abdoulaye Wade’s Parti Democratique Sénégalais. Senegal also 
rates highly on levels of political freedom, as measured by such renowned indices as those of Freedom 
House and Polity (see Table 1). By contrast, Burkina Faso’s current president, Blaise Compaoré, came to 
power via a bloody coup in 1987, and while he has gradually allowed more political freedoms over the 
past two decades, he and his party, Congrès pour la démocratie el le progrès, retain political control.  
Table 1. Comparison of Burkina Faso and Senegal 
Indicator Burkina  Faso  Senegal 
Agriculture value-added as a share of GDP (%), 2006
a 31  16 
Average agricultural growth (%), 1996–2006
a 6  2.5 
GDP per capita (2000 constant USD), 2006
a 262  499 
Share of population in agricultural sector (%), 2004
b   92   72  
Political rights ranking, 2008
c 5  2
  
Democracy score, 2006
d 2  8 
Sources: 
a World Development Indicators, World Bank; 
b calculated from the State of Food and Agriculture (Rome: FAO 2007); 
c 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008; 
d Polity IV. 
Note: The political rights rankings are on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 representing “most free” and 7 representing “most restricted.” 
By contrast, the democracy score, which captures how institutionalized democracy is, ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing 
full institutionalization.  
Although the countries share relatively low levels of GDP per capita with sizable shares of their 
populations living below the poverty line, agriculture constitutes more than twice the share of GDP in 
Burkina Faso than in the more urbanized Senegal. While this certainly implies that the sector should be 
accorded priority in Burkina Faso’s development, it also indicates that there are even fewer resources to 
invest in agriculture from industry and services.  
Along with a number of other African countries, Senegal and Burkina Faso share a history of 
Bretton Woods–sponsored structural adjustment programs, which have had important implications for 
collective action. Neoliberal agricultural policies left smallholder producers with minimal access to 
necessary inputs, including fertilizers and seeds (Oya 2006). In response, smallholders responded by 
collectively organizing in autonomous producer groups oriented around different production lines.
3 In 
Senegal, the major producer confederation is known as the Conseil National de Concertation et de 
Coopération des Ruraux (CNCR). Established in 1993, CNCR currently encompasses 22 federations 
spanning livestock, fisheries, forests, women’s rights, and agriculture. The confederation has two main 
objectives: (1) improve the level of communication and cooperation among existing producer groups; and 
(2) ensure that producers speak with a single voice when engaging with the state and other development 
partners.
4  
                                                      
3 Interview with official from the World Bank Senegal Country Office, June 27, 2006; interview with representative of 
CNCR, June 28, 2006.  
4 Interview with member of CNCR, June 28, 2006.    6
In Burkina Faso, one of the earliest producer groups was the Fédération Nationale des 
Organisations Paysannes (FENOP), which emerged from a conference of peasant organizations in 1994 
and became formalized in 1996.
5 The Confédération des Paysannes du Faso (CPF) emerged in 2002 with 
assistance from the government (World Bank 2004). Since CPF concentrates on promoting export, 
commodity-oriented agriculture, which contrasts with FENOP’s focus on smallholder, family farms, 
FENOP did not join CPF and transformed itself into an NGO that today works with around 250 peasant 
organizations focused on cereal, fruit, and vegetable production (Bingen 2003).
6 CPF consists of five 
major producer federations and benefits from institutional links with the Ministry of Agriculture.
7 Indeed, 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that the ability of producers to access the technical 
and political structures surrounding agricultural policymaking is very important, and as such, the ministry 
organizes annual consultations with farmers’ organizations to learn about their opinions on various issues. 
In addition, there are frequent consultations (cadres de consultations) for specific subsectors that extend 
from the village to the national levels.
8    
These producer groups have proven to be pivotal stakeholders in the crafting of national 
agricultural policies that have aimed to be highly participatory. Yet, by focusing on the Loi d’Orientation 
Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale (LOASP), the Senegalese case reveals how an emphasis on participatory 
policymaking in a democratic context can hinder the actual task of policy implementation, especially 
when trade-offs among priorities could alienate particular political constituencies. In Burkina Faso’s more 
circumscribed political environment, the major hindrance to the implementation of the country’s Stratégie 
de Développement Rural (SDR) is the lack of adequate resources. Both cases illustrate how elaborate 
processes of participatory policymaking can be a misplaced use of scarce resources when the necessary 
implementation of these policies remains absent.  
3.2. Senegal’s Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale 
LOASP represents Senegal’s most current agricultural framework and the culmination of almost four 
decades of shifts in agricultural policymaking. Indeed, after an expensive period of state intervention in 
the agricultural sector between the 1960s and 1980s, the country adopted in the mid-1980s and 1990s the 
Nouvelle Politique Agricole and the Programmes d’Ajustement Structural Agricole (PASA). These 
programs promoted market liberalization by reducing state support to producers and transferring the 
management of production, processing, and marketing to the private sector. A key development during 
this period was the privatization of the formally state-run groundnut company, Sociéte Nationale de 
Commercialisation des Oléagineux du Sénégal, which was intended to stop the company’s mounting 
losses (Oya 2006; Sène 2005). 
PASA, however, did not achieve the government’s agricultural growth objectives. As such, 
Senegal entered its third period of agricultural policy in 1998 with the objective of encouraging 
productive rural investments through an approach of partnership and decentralization and the 
implementation of the Programme d’Investissement du Secteur Agricole (PISA). By 1999, the Senegalese 
government decided to reinforce PISA by signing an agreement with the World Bank and IMF known as 
the Programme de Services Agricoles et Organisations des Producteurs (PSAOP) (World Bank 2006).
9 
The overall aim of PSAOP is to foster stronger synergies among rural producers, research institutions, 
                                                      
5 Interview with FENOP representatives, July 6, 2006.  
6 See also the ROPPA website, http://www.roppa.info, accessed July 25, 2006.  
7 These are the Fédération des Eleveurs du Burkina (FEB), Féderation Professionnels Agricoles du Faso 
(FEPAB), Fédération Nationale des Jeunes Professionnels Agricoles du Faso (FNJPAF), Fédération Nationale des 
Femmes Rurales du Burkina (FENAFER-B), and Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du Burkina (UNPCB).  
8 Interview with officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, July 4, 2006.  
9 Interviews with official from DAPS/Ministry of Agriculture, June 23, 2006, and World Bank Senegal Country Office, June 
27, 2006.    7
and the agricultural/rural extension services, and it is viewed as the umbrella program for macroeconomic 
reforms within the agricultural sector.
10  
After the historic elections in March 2000, newly elected President Abdoulaye Wade announced 
that to complement PSAOP, Senegal needed a grand vision for its agricultural sector. This vision was to 
be constructed through a vast process of consultation that ultimately resulted in LOASP, which is 
Senegal’s vision of how to modernize the agricultural sector over the next 20 years and provides legal 
recognition for the institutional reforms associated with PSAOP.
11 The major principle of LOASP is to 
contribute to the reduction of poverty and diminish inequalities between urban and rural populations.  
The construction of LOASP involved more than two years of negotiations with development 
partners, civil society organizations, producer groups, and other ministries within the government. These 
consultations occurred via multiple channels, including workshops, public testimonies in the media by 
university professors and celebrities, and a vast letter-writing campaign in which citizens could share their 
views on the country’s agricultural policy. Since this was a novel and momentous undertaking, every 
contribution to the process was archived by the government. This consultative process also confirmed the 
government’s concern with upholding the tenets of its decentralization program and the importance of 
local decision making.
12  
Along with the country’s two major agricultural research institutes—the Institut Sénégalais de 
Recherche Agricole and the Institut de Technologie Alimentaire—the producer organizations within 
CNCR played a key role in this participatory process. To ensure that LOASP reflected the views of 
smallholders, CNCR held 35 consultations at the local level, 11 at the regional level, and one at the 
national level. This activism had a large impact since according to one CNCR member, 9 out of 10 of the 
propositions within the finalized LOASP had been recommended by CNCR.
13  
In 2004, LOASP was finally submitted to the National Assembly, where it was accepted and later 
promulgated. Thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture engaged in a vast communication campaign that 
involved the distribution of both the finalized law as well as an adapted text with illustrations and 
pedagogical explanations translated into the country’s six main indigenous languages—Jola, Mandinke, 
Pulaar, Serer, Soninke, and Wolof.
14 However, laws in Senegal cannot be implemented until the president 
issues a series of executive orders, known as décrets d’application, which specify exactly how a law will 
actually be applied in practice. Despite approval of LOASP in 2004, a series of décrets was not issued 
until mid-2007 (CNCR 2008; Diop 2008).  
Stakeholders speculated that the delay was linked to a key point of ideological contention 
between organizations such as CNCR and the Senegalese government. Specifically, since 1964, land in 
Senegal officially has been under control of the state (Pigeaud 2003). However, articles 22 and 23 of 
LOASP stipulate the need to privatize land in order to encourage private investment and allow producers 
to use ownership of their land as collateral for obtaining credit (DAPS 2004). This would allow outside 
investors and those with the requisite financial resources to gain access to land. By contrast, CNCR has 
long advocated that land should be transferred to smallholders based on a right of usage, thereby formally 
acknowledging their rights to the land on which they already live and farm (Pigeaud 2003). Likewise, 
many civil society participants at a workshop about LOASP expressed anxiety that privatizing land might 
disadvantage poor smallholders by favoring outside investors and more affluent domestic producers 
(CNCR 2003). Given this controversy, some stakeholders suspected that President Wade purposely 
delayed issuing the décrets until after the February 2007 presidential and June 2007 legislative elections 
to avoid alienating potential voters, a majority of whom are smallholders.
15  
                                                      
10 Ibid.  
11 Interview with official from DAPS/Ministry of Agriculture, June 23, 2006. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Interview with member of CNCR, June 28, 2006.  
14 Interview with official from DAPS/Ministry of Agriculture, June 23, 2006.  
15 Interview with representative from Réseau Interface, June 27, 2006. Interface is a network of CEOs and investors from 
small and medium agribusiness enterprises in Africa that invests in agricultural research and collaborates with farmers’ 
organizations.    8
In addition to this conflict, there are at least three reasons why the ultimate significance of 
LOASP remains questionable despite the highly participatory and transparent manner in which LOASP 
was crafted. First, LOASP is really a legal framework that affirms the tenets of PSAOP. As such, the 
implication is that after PSAOP was adopted and implemented, it was decided that reforms within 
agriculture needed to be embedded within a grander and more inclusive vision for the sector. Second, 
interview respondents from civil society believe that the Ministry of Agriculture in particular does not 
have sufficient technical expertise or financial resources to implement the vision captured by LOASP.
16 
Third, in the wake of riots over rising food prices in Dakar during early 2008, President Wade rapidly 
announced another initiative, known as the Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance 
(GOANA), to improve Senegal’s food self-sufficiency. According to a statement issued by CNCR, the 
initiative poses extremely ambitious objectives to be achieved over a very short period, and the 
organization was not consulted by the government before the program was devised. Rather than GOANA, 
CNCR argues that the government should remain focused on LOASP (CNCR 2008). 
3.3. Burkina Faso’s Stratégie de Dévéloppement Rural  
Burkina Faso’s agricultural policy trajectory mirrors the Senegalese case in many ways. In 1992, Burkina 
Faso also adopted an agricultural structural adjustment program, which aimed to modernize and diversify 
production, reinforce food security, and improve the management of natural resources. Some of the 
program’s main achievements included the liberalization of agricultural trade and prices for agricultural 
inputs, the privatization or liquidation of public enterprises involved in agricultural production, and the 
reorganization of agricultural extension services (SP-CPSA 2004).  
Yet because of the state’s low institutional capacity and dearth of human resources, the program’s 
impact on agricultural growth and poverty reduction was negligible. By 1997, the government shifted its 
focus to crafting a long-term strategy for generating sustainable growth in the agricultural and livestock 
sectors. Through the elaboration of the Document d’Orientations Stratégiques and the Plan Stratégique 
Opérationnel, priority program areas were identified and action plans for each producer area were created. 
The overall objectives of this approach were to increase agricultural production from 5 to 10 percent over 
the next 10 years, contribute to the growth of revenues for agricultural producers by at least 3 percent per 
person per year, create favorable conditions for the availability and accessibility of the population to food 
that is sufficient to provide 2,500 kilocalories per person per day, and improve rural communities’ 
management of natural resources (SP-CPSA 2004). However, insufficient harmonization among 
government ministries hindered the implementation of these strategies, resulting in unnecessary 
duplication in some areas and neglect in others.
17  
These lessons influenced the creation in 2002 of the Secrétariat Permanent de la Coordination des 
Politiques Sectorielles Agricoles (SP-CPSA) and the crafting of the country’s SDR. Originally, a Comité 
de Coordination de Politique Sectorielle Agricole was established that met once or twice per year to 
ensure the coherence of agricultural policies and consisted of 13 national ministries, the 13 governors of 
Burkina Faso, and representatives of all the associative civil society structures. After two meetings of the 
committee, it was decided that a permanent secretary was essential for this large task. A third structure, 
known as the Comité Régional de Coordination de Politique Sectorielle, was also established in 2005 to 
harmonize sectoral policies within each of the 13 states. Although SP-CPSA is located within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, its creation was spearheaded by the ministries of animal resources, the 
environment, and agriculture.
18  
SP-CPSA is the main body responsible for the formulation of SDR, which represents the 
government’s vision for the rural sector until 2015. SDR’s main objective is to ensure growth within the 
rural sector that contributes to the fight against poverty, reinforces food security, and promotes 
sustainable development (SP-CPSA 2004). In creating SDR, a participatory process was used that first 
                                                      
16 Interview with member of CNCR, June 28, 2006.  
17 Interview with official from SP-CPSA, July 7, 2006. 
18 Ibid.    9
required examining the various existing programs and priorities within the different ministries to discover 
where common objectives could be found. Over the course of almost two years, starting in 2002, a long, 
consultative process involving technical and regional workshops allowed a number of actors, particularly 
CPF but also NGOs and agricultural researchers, to validate the harmonized text.
19 Accordingly, the 
government adopted SDR in December 2003 (SP-CPSA 2004).  
Since then, SP-CPSA has embarked on a vast information campaign to further increase awareness 
about SDR. Specifically, the strategy was translated into 12 national languages, and SP-CPSA has been 
working with local NGOs that can communicate best with populations at the local level. Moreover, SP-
CPSA publicized the strategy through the use of television and radio as well as created a virtual library 
where Burkinabè can access SDR. In 2005 and 2006, SP-CPSA also distributed CD-ROMs on SDR, and 
it plans to have a number of conferences and workshops in each region.
20  
However, limitations on financial and human resources continue to hinder the implementation of 
both SDR as well as the comprehensive communication strategy that SP-CPSA envisions.  For instance, 
SP-CPSA decided to establish a focal point in each of the country’s 13 regions who will be responsible 
for collecting information on performance indicators and determining how they have evolved over time. 
Yet the biggest problem remains the lack of good candidates for this job given the high level of human 
capacity required. An official from SP-CPSA also noted that his organ functions only because of funds 
from donors such as the European Union, GTZ, and DANIDA and hopes that the Burkinabè government 
will be able at some point to provide more money.
21 An official from the Ministry of Agriculture noted 
that in general, the low level of government investment in agriculture is not commensurate with the 
sector’s contribution to the economy.
22  
Although they confirmed their participation in the elaboration of SDR, civil society organizations 
and producer groups noted their ignorance of what has happened with the strategy and emphasized that in 
any case, the version of SDR finalized in December 2003 does not reflect their contributions at the 
workshops to which they were invited. CPF, for instance, believes that too much emphasis was placed on 
agro-business and stressed that it has its own vision for the rural world that is different from that of the 
government’s.
23 Members of the NGO Coalition pour la Protection du Patrimoine Génétique Africain 
similarly argued that their participation in drafting the SDR was not reflected in the finalized text and 
admitted they were unaware of the political process involved for approving the final SDR.
24  
The failure to implement a strategy fully within a given time period is problematic in a country 
like Burkina Faso, where ministers and ministerial priorities easily change.  This predicament, along with 
other concerns, prompted SP-CPSA to consider embarking on yet another revision of SDR in 2007.
25 
Thus, despite recognizing the importance of harmonizing sectoral policies and spearheading a broad, 
consultative campaign to determine SDR’s contents, the strategy has yet to be implemented, and input 
from some of the country’s main civil society actors was believed to have been ignored.    
 
                                                      
19 Interviews with officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, July 4, 2006, and SP-CPSA, July 7, 2006.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Interview with official from the Ministry of Agriculture, July 5, 2006.  
23 Interview with CPF representatives, July 1, 2006.  
24 Interview with members of COPAGEN, July 4, 2006.  
25 Interview with official from SP-CPSA, July 7, 2006.    10
4.  AGRICULTURAL POLICY PROCESSES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL  
Additional challenges emerge with respect to participatory strategy design that involves a majority of 
West African countries. In particular, when the locus of policymaking shifts to the supraregional level, the 
degree of participation should ideally be enlarged to account for the greater number of affected 
stakeholders. At the same time, however, when countries have disparate agricultural priorities, as well as 
varying socioeconomic and democratic conditions, incorporating the views of civil society stakeholders 
can be perceived as an additional constraint to arriving at a consensus on the content of a regional 
agricultural strategy.  
One of the main civil society actors at the regional level is the Réseau des Organisations 
Paysannes et de Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA), which consists of 10 national 
farmers’ organizations, including Senegal’s CNCR and Burkina Faso’s CPF.
26 Established in 2000 with 
the mandate of increasing the value of smallholder agriculture in West Africa, the organization is highly 
outspoken on policy issues both within the subregion and on the broader continental scale. Yet, as 
detailed with respect to two regional agricultural strategies, its participation in the policymaking process 
has not always translated into the desired impact.  
4.1. La Politique Agricole d’UEMOA  
The first agricultural strategy is the Politique Agricole d’UEMOA (PAU), which was adopted in 
December 2001 by the leaders of UEMOA’s eight member states. PAU’s three main objectives were to 
(1) achieve food security by reducing food dependency and making agricultural markets more 
operational; (2) increase agricultural productivity and production in a sustainable manner; and (3) 
improve the living conditions of producers through the enhancement of their income and social status and 
the development of the rural economy (UEMOA 2002).  
In drafting PAU, UEMOA adopted a participatory process involving a series of consultations. 
First, a baseline study was conducted by a mixture of international and regional consultants who met with 
a broad range of stakeholders in each member country to uncover key concerns and priorities. After a 
draft document was completed, it was submitted to a scientific board made up of high-level African and 
European researchers. The scientific board’s report was subsequently submitted to the three main organs 
of UEMOA, who incorporated their comments into the report. Between July and August 2001, a national 
workshop was held in each of the eight states, and in October 2001 a final report was presented at a 
regional workshop in Ouagadougou, where ROPPA offered extensive comments. Finally, a draft bill that 
included the objectives and intervention areas of PAU was submitted to experts and ministers in charge of 
agricultural and animal resources and ultimately adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and 
Government.
27  
ROPPA confirmed that it was very involved in the crafting of this policy and that its 
representatives presented two main demands during the regional workshop, both of which were 
incorporated into PAU: an emphasis on family farming and the establishment of a regional fund for 
agricultural development. Yet ROPPA was generally displeased with the adoption of this common 
agricultural policy after the implementation of a common external tariff (CET) within the UEMOA 
member states in January 2000. The CET stipulates the adoption of a uniform tariff structure whereby the 
maximum import tariff is 20 percent, lower than what most states previously applied. As such, the 
producer organizations believed that the goals of UEMOA are undermined because farmers are more 
vulnerable to the importation of lower-priced, subsidized goods from overseas (ROPPA 2001).
28  
                                                      
26 The other eight are the Fédération des Unions de Producteurs du Bénin, Association Nationale des Organisations 
Professionnelles Agricoles de Cote d’Ivoire, National Coordinating Farmers of Gambia, Conseil Nationale des Organisations 
Paysannes–Guinea, Plate-forme Nationale des Organisations Paysannes–Guinea Bissau, Coordination Nationale des 
Organisations Paysannes du Mali, Plate-forme Paysanne du Niger, and Coordination Togolaise des Organisations Paysannes. 
27 Interview with officials from UEMOA, June 30, 2006.  
28 Also, interview with ROPPA members, July 5, 2006    11
Officials from UEMOA claimed that the next step is actually to implement PAU and that they are 
in the midst of creating a Regional Agricultural Development Fund to finance it.
29 This conclusion is 
rather surprising considering that during the time of this research, the policy was at least five years old. 
Nonetheless, it was confirmed by a number of interview participants who were aware of the strategy’s 
existence yet unsure of its practical meaning. Perhaps due to the controversy over the tariff rate 
reductions, one interviewee even believed that the policy’s main focus was agricultural trade rather than 
an identification and achievement of regional agricultural objectives.
30  
4.2. CAADP in West Africa: ECOWAP  
By January 2005, the heads of state and government of the ECOWAS member countries had accepted 
another agricultural policy for the subregion, known as the Agricultural Policy of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAP). This policy is the West African version of the broader 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) implemented under the auspices of 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This strategy also affirms the centrality of 
family farms and emphasizes each country’s ability to exercise its sovereignty with regard to achieving 
food security. The operation plan to implement ECOWAP was adopted in May 2005, and a program of 
investment is currently under way (ECOWAS 2005).
31  
ROPPA was not very supportive of the broader CAADP strategy and argued that the vision, 
orientation, and strategies of NEPAD were not sufficiently discussed and negotiated with family farmers 
and the organizations that represent them. In particular, ROPPA believed that NEPAD was too oriented 
around improving access to export markets rather than emphasizing the importance of improving 
provision for, and access to, domestic markets (ROPPA 2003). With respect to ECOWAP in particular, 
ROPPA’s members were disappointed to learn that in January 2006, the heads of state and government of 
ECOWAS decided to extend the CET for UEMOA to the ECOWAS states. That decision was taken to 
promote further regional economic integration as well as to preclude smugglers from benefiting from 
differential tariff rates within the ECOWAS zone. In the opinion of producer organizations, however, the 
decision undermines ECOWAP’s emphasis on food self-sufficiency and increasing small farmers’ 
incomes because it may facilitate the importation of food imports. ROPPA’s Burkinabè member, CPF, 
also expressed displeasure with the lack of transparency in the process of making this decision. Indeed, 
the choice to adopt the CET was not debated in the parliaments of any of the ECOWAS states.
32  
Nevertheless, ECOWAS has proceeded with designing a roadmap for the introduction of the 
CET, which was expected to become operational in January 2008. The objective is a four-band tariff 
regime that will range from 0 to 20 percent for certain categories of goods imported from non-ECOWAS 
countries. Contrary to ROPPA’s fears, it is also anticipated that additional taxes will be applied to certain 
goods that threaten the subregion’s agricultural and industrial sectors (ECOWAS 2006).  
 
                                                      
29 Interview with officials from UEMOA, June 30, 2006.    
30 Interview with member of Senegal’s National Biosafety Committee, June 24, 2006.  
31 Also, interview with CORAF representatives, June 22, 2006, and with ROPPA members, July 5, 2006.  
32 Interview with ROPPA members, July 5, 2006.    12
5.  ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Contrary to the common criticisms in the participation literature, the four cases presented above all 
highlight that broad-based participation in the creation of agricultural and rural development strategies 
has featured prominently in West Africa. The substantial degree of participation at both the national and 
regional levels certainly was aided by the organizational capacity of agricultural producers, including 
small-scale farmers and rural women. Given that other countries in the region, such as Ghana, do not have 
umbrella farmers’ organizations with coverage similar to CNCR in Senegal, and FENOP or CFP in 
Burkina Faso (Agricord 2008), this level of organization among agricultural producers and the rural 
population should not be taken for granted.33 Instead, the cases revealed that large-scale, participatory 
processes may not result in either the strategies stakeholders originally advocated or any substantial 
policy implementation on the ground. A number of common themes among the cases highlight why this 
problem may occur. First, and most significantly, the role, function, and justification of participation in 
the policy process was undefined, leading to disappointment among some stakeholders. Participation does 
not imply consensus because distinct interest groups will frequently favor different priorities. As 
discussed, small-scale farmers believed that their vision was not incorporated into Burkina Faso’s strategy 
and felt that the adoption of tariff reductions by UEMOA and ECOWAS ignored the challenges they 
faced from international markets. In the case of Senegal, disagreement over the proper approach to land 
reform among different interest groups and the fear of alienating potential voters might have possibly 
contributed to the delay in issuing a presidential decree for implementing LOASP until after the 2007 
elections.  
The fact that participatory processes are ultimately dominated by different interest groups leads to 
a fundamental, normative question of policymaking: Under which conditions will the participation of 
organized stakeholders create more legitimate outcomes than other policy processes, such as deliberations 
in parliaments and formation of policy positions within political parties? In democratic countries, such as 
Senegal, the members of the assembly are democratically elected by the entire population, whereas 
stakeholder organizations still represent specific, nonelected interest groups. In West Africa, institutions 
of representative democracy also exist at the regional level: UEMOA has an interparliamentary 
committee, and ECOWAS has a parliament. Certainly, parliaments in African countries are still 
emerging, even in countries with relatively high democracy scores. A study on legislatures in Africa still 
rates the independence and strength of the Senegalese parliament as weak (Barkan, Ademolekun, and 
Zhou 2004). Nevertheless, there is a need to clarify the fundamental relationship between stakeholder 
participation and the institutions of representative democracy, such as parliaments and political parties. 
Even in well-developed, Western democracies, participation typically has functioned only to give citizens 
“a voice, but not a vote,” based on the premise that ultimate legitimacy rests with elected bodies.34 
A second theme among the four cases was the lack of communication by governments about the 
decisions taken subsequent to the period of stakeholder involvement. This ranged from complete 
ignorance regarding the fate of an agricultural strategy to not understanding why certain provisions 
contrary to what smallholder organizations originally advocated were nonetheless eventually adopted. 
This highlights the need to create accountability for participatory processes, including a commitment by 
the organizers of such processes to clarify to participants at the outset what the expected role of their 
involvement will be. Moreover, participants should subsequently be informed of which suggestions were 
ultimately incorporated or excluded in the finalized strategy and why. Particularly at the regional level, 
                                                      
33 In countries where farmers and the rural poor are less well organized, it would be useful to consider formats of 
participation other than stakeholder workshops. In fact, a wide range of possibilities exists for citizen engagement, such as 
consensus conferences and citizen juries, which can be considered forms of “deliberative democracy” (Button and Ryfe 2008). 
So far, such options have remained largely unexplored for the purpose of developing agricultural strategies and policies, and it 
would be useful to start experimenting with them.  
34 An example of this principle is the Aarhus Convention of the European Union. While being one of the most ambitious 
efforts to promote citizen participation ever undertaken at the regional level, the convention gives citizens a voice, not a vote (EU 
2003).   13
institutional mechanisms that link civil society groups with the heads of ECOWAS and UEMOA member 
countries may facilitate the flow of information from stakeholders to decision makers and vice versa.  
Third, despite extensive stakeholder workshops and forums, a common trend in all cases was that 
the agricultural or rural development strategy was not implemented even years after the participatory 
processes were conducted. Often, the lack of implementation was attributed to a dearth of financial 
resources. Yet, instead of viewing agricultural and rural development strategies as programs that can only 
be implemented with additional resources, they should represent policy documents that guide the 
spending of existing resources. Ideally, agricultural and rural strategies should be considered in every 
annual budget process at the regional, national, and subnational levels, and, if donors have not moved to 
general budget support, they should inform all development projects in the agricultural and rural sector. 
However, the strategy documents are often far too general to serve that purpose. For instance, Burkina 
Faso’s strategy revolves around seven objectives: increase diversity and intensify agricultural, pastoral, 
and forestry production; reinforce the links between production and the market; increase and diversify 
revenue sources; improve the provision of potable water and sanitation; ensure a sustainable management 
of natural resources; reinforce the capacity of actors and create a favorable institutional framework; and 
ameliorate the economic situation of women and youth in the rural sector (SP-CPSA 2004). Although 
these are deemed “strategic axes,” they generally amount to a broad list of issues that the strategy aims to 
address.  
A few solutions could help address this problem. One option is for policymakers to adopt action 
or investment plans as a second step, subsequent to participatory, strategy development. In the case of 
Burkina Faso, SDR offers suggestions about how the state, technical partners, NGOs, and the private 
sector could all financially contribute to the strategy. However, those suggestions are relatively vague, 
noting for example that the state could borrow money, engage in fiscal reforms to raise the necessary 
resources, and offer smallholders lines of credit (SP-CPSA 2004, 124–25). With respect to UEMOA’s 
agricultural policy, specific donor contributions are elaborated but how exactly the money will be used is 
not detailed (UEMOA 2002, 42). ECOWAP represents the only one of the four cases to have an 
investment plan for implementing its strategy (ECOWAS 2005).  
Developing more refined strategies that do not simply reflect every stakeholder’s wishes 
represents a second option. This may require the use of rigorous methods for priority setting, which can 
be well integrated into participatory processes. The use of multicriteria analysis is an example (Stirling 
2006). This method makes it possible to rank development options according to several criteria, which 
can be assigned different weights. The method has considerable potential for priority setting in 
agricultural strategies given that agricultural development options need to be assessed against multiple 
criteria, such as income generation, food security, and environmental sustainability. In addition to the use 
of such techniques, the introduction of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of 
rural and agricultural strategies should create more accountability for strategy implementation.  
Involving at the outset the major bodies responsible for decision making, such as parliaments, in 
the participatory strategy formulation process may also help reduce the disconnect between participation 
and implementation. For example, participatory processes to develop agricultural strategies could be 
steered by parliamentary committees in charge of agriculture. Likewise, political parties with a rural 
membership base could engage in consultations with their members to develop a position on contested 
issues within agricultural strategies. Although international development agencies tend to stay away from 
parliaments and political parties because they fear this may be inconsistent with their “apolitical” 
mandate, international agencies need to recognize how their promotion of participatory processes can 
strengthen, rather than undermine, emerging institutions of representative democracy in Africa. 
Nongovernmental organizations could play a stronger role in this regard, especially with regard to those 
activities, such as working with political parties, where governmental development agencies face certain 
limits. 
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Providing the space for stakeholders to contribute their voices to the formulation of policies directly 
relevant to their lives is extremely important. Particularly in Africa, where a number of countries 
transitioned to democracy only in the 1990s, the move toward participatory approaches at both the 
national and regional levels is highly laudable. Yet, contrary to the conventional wisdom, more 
participation does not automatically result in better outcomes, and any type of strategy making will be 
inherently political, influenced by different interest groups with differential levels of power. Indeed, the 
four cases presented in this paper reveal that the formulation of agricultural and rural development 
strategies in West Africa was not hindered by a lack of participation by key stakeholders. Instead, major 
challenges included false expectations about the role participation would have on policy outcomes and the 
failure to link strategies resulting from participatory processes with actual decision making on agricultural 
policies and spending.  
Given earlier theories of collective action and urban bias that questioned the capacity of rural 
dwellers to come together and advocate policies favorable to their own interests (e.g., Bates 1981), the 
strength of autonomous farmers’ organizations in West Africa today represents an important advance. 
Development agencies should ensure that such organizations do not waste their scarce resources on 
strategy formulation processes that have little impact on the real agricultural policies that governments 
implement. Otherwise, even highly participatory processes may ultimately create a lack of trust and 
disillusionment among agricultural and rural stakeholders.  
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